Recreation Reform: Leveling the Playing Field in Post-Katrina New Orleans by Fielkow, Arnie & Kamath, Mithun B.
New England Journal of Public Policy 
Volume 32 
Issue 1 Social Traps and Social Trust: 
Institutional Transformations in an American 
City following a Natural Disaster 
Article 9 
3-21-2020 
Recreation Reform: Leveling the Playing Field in Post-Katrina New 
Orleans 
Arnie Fielkow 
Jewish Federation of Greater New Orleans 
Mithun B. Kamath 
Jewish Federation of Greater New Orleans 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp 
 Part of the Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, Public Policy Commons, Recreation, 
Parks and Tourism Administration Commons, and the Urban Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fielkow, Arnie and Kamath, Mithun B. (2020) "Recreation Reform: Leveling the Playing Field in Post-
Katrina New Orleans," New England Journal of Public Policy: Vol. 32 : Iss. 1 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol32/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in New England Journal of Public Policy by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For 
more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu. 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
Recreation Reform: Leveling the Playing Field in Post-Katrina New 
Orleans 
 
Arnie D. Fielkow1 with Mithun B. Kamath2 
 
Between 2000 and 2005, I was in charge of every aspect of the New Orleans Saints’ non-
football operations, from ticket sales to corporate sponsorships to lease negotiations for the 
Superdome. By spring 2007, though, by some combination of fate, determination, and maybe a 
little naiveté, I found myself in charge of legislatively repairing the City of New Orleans’ entire 
system of recreation. I quickly discovered that this was no small task. 
To add some context: I moved to New Orleans in 2000 to become executive vice president of 
the Saints. Five years later, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, changing the lives of many 
thousands of people living in New Orleans and along the coast, including my family and me. For 
many long months afterward, I was unsure of what to do next. In all that time, while my mind 
wandered far and wide considering the direction in which my professional life might be headed, I 
never gave a thought to abandoning the adopted hometown with which my family and I had fallen 
in love. I soon realized that I did not have to support the city’s rebuilding merely by living there 
but that I could play an active role in that recovery by running for an at-large seat on the New 
Orleans City Council. In May 2006, I won that seat, and, at my request, I was appointed chair of 
the Council’s Youth and Recreation Committee. I asked for that assignment because of my sincere 
belief in the power of sports to unify diverse individuals and groups. I thought that recreation, as 
much as any other government program, had a chance to help bring New Orleans back. By fall 
2006. I was working to put back together the pieces of a recreation department that had been 
deteriorating for decades even before Katrina. Restoring the recreation department was as 
important to me in the wake of Katrina as the rebuilding of actual infrastructure. 
The New Orleans Recreation Department (NORD) was created by ordinance in 1946 as a 
department directly under the purview of the mayor of New Orleans. For many years, NORD was 
the epitome of a well-run municipal agency, even inspiring a United States Supreme Court Justice 
to cite it as “the most progressive” recreation department in the country.1 Continually underfunded 
and understaffed, though, NORD was in such a dire state when I arrived on the city council sixty 
years later that the equipment looked as though it had been on the department’s first purchase 
order. To make matters worse, the quality of recreation in New Orleans showed an undeniable 
racial disparity—NORD-owned facilities and programs (used primarily by African American 
residents) were very different from those owned and operated by private organizations (used 
primarily by white residents), such as the Carrollton Boosters Club, to which my own three sons 
belonged. The irony of the Carrollton Boosters facilities when I joined the city council was that 
they were located in the middle of Hollygrove, one of the poorest neighborhoods in the city.  
 
 
1Arnie D. Fielkow served on the New Orleans City Council from 2006 to 2011. He is now CEO of the Jewish 
Federation of Greater New Orleans.  
2Mithun B. Kamath served from 2013 to 2018 as an assistant district attorney at the Orleans Parish District 
Attorney’s Office. He is now director of Governmental Affairs & External Partnerships at the Jewish Federation of 
Greater New Orleans. 
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Compared to the private groups, NORD was not financially or organizationally sound, as was 
readily apparent in the poorly maintained fields, the old uniforms and equipment, and the coaches, 
who had the best of hearts and intentions but little to no formal training. Even before Katrina, but 
especially after, this disparity gnawed at me personally and professionally. My colleagues on the 
Youth and Recreation Committee and I sought to make the system more fair and to ensure that the 
city’s recreation services were rebuilt to a standard well beyond the one in which they had 
wallowed before the storm. 
It all started with input from citizens. If there was any silver lining to Hurricane Katrina, it 
was the colossal increase in vigorous citizen participation in government—an essential component 
of a government that works well for its constituents—and that included recreation. With no 
particular agenda in mind, we set out to hear about the way that the city had run NORD over the 
years from the people that knew the issue best—those who used (or least attempted to use) the 
department’s limited resources.  
We also called committee meetings to hear from NORD’s administrators about what they 
were doing in the short- and long-term to improve citizens’ access to recreation activities. It was 
not the sexiest post-Katrina recovery issue on which I was working, and the hearings themselves 
were not always pretty either. They put on display a severe dysfunction that was exemplified by 
the department’s nonsensical approach to its facilities’ hours of operation and the high turnover of 
the leadership of NORD, which had twelve different directors between 1978 and 2008.2 But that 
was the point—we wanted and needed to get into the nitty gritty of the policies and operations to 
determine, for example, why there were weeds all over our city’s playgrounds. Much of what we 
learned revealed to us what a city should not be doing with its recreation department. 
Finally, we learned a great deal from Baton Rouge. Our neighbor to the west is often chided 
for being New Orleans lite, but, we discovered, when it came to recreation services, Baton Rouge 
was miles ahead of us. BREC, the acronym given to the recreation program in East Baton Rouge 
Parish, had won several awards, and we were lucky to be able to turn to it as a model for best 
practices.  
The recommendations we received were many and varied, but over the course of numerous 
public hearings and listening sessions between 2007 and 2008, the one thing that we heard time 
and again was that recreation in New Orleans needed proper funding. We found, however, that 
citizens were not asking for blank checks or allocations well out of proportion with the city’s 
budget but were asking only for the bare minimum amount they believed the city should have been 
devoting to NORD all along. For example, between 1985 and 1991—following the oil bust of the 
mid-1980s—NORD’s annual budget was cut from $6.2 million to $2.2 million, which in 2010 
dollars amounted to a cut from $12.5 million to $3.5 million, a staggering decline.3 The challenges 
were pushing for recreation as a priority when there were so many other rebuilding priorities facing 
City Hall and then cutting through the red tape to access whatever funds were available. I certainly 
did not envy the position in which Mayor Ray Nagin and his team, as well as the state and federal 
governments, found themselves in the aftermath of the storm, but I was disappointed by the many 
roadblocks they all put up as we on the committee tried to make progress on the provision of 
recreation services. Delays were often instituted in the name of fiscal responsibility, but I suspect 
many had more to do with lack of political will and, sadly, lack of appetite for reform. The Nagin 
administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were frustratingly 
unwilling or unable to coordinate logistics and stalled on the most basic of repairs and 
constructions despite my pleas and those of others for urgency—even when the funds were 
supposedly there for the taking.4 
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Partly for that reason, one recommendation piqued my interest more than the others—it was 
suggested that New Orleans simultaneously address the structural and the financial issues 
associated with recreation by moving key pieces of NORD out of city government, with its inherent 
politicization and unpredictability. Proponents believed that administration of recreation services 
by a quasi-independent board and CEO as part of a “public-private partnership,” still accountable 
to city government and with council oversight but not completely beholden to the mayor or any 
other individual, would result in increased efficiency, and moreover, that less of a reliance on 
limited and discretionary public funds in favor of corporate and other private funds would result 
in a more stable budget year after year. It was a revolutionary idea but one that I immediately 
believed had merit. After all, since post-Katrina New Orleans had become a laboratory for so many 
other innovative ideas—the education system most notable among them—why not recreation, too, 
if the idea was feasible? And what did we as a city have to lose? In July 2008, almost three years 
after Katrina, the nonprofit organization Greater New Orleans Afterschool Partnership formally 
presented the Youth and Recreation Committee with the proposal to revamp recreation in New 
Orleans with a public-private partnership model similar to BREC in Baton Rouge. As I said at the 
committee hearing (and still believe today), NORD was not in need of a Band-Aid but in need of 
a major overhaul, and in my mind the public-private partnership was the solution.5 
With the end goal now clearly defined, a smooth approval and implementation process was 
imperative. By the time of the proposal, I had my legs under me as a public official, and I was 
confident that I could lead the recreation effort legislatively—and yet one of the best decisions I 
made in the entire process was to build an all-star team of private sector advocates to work with 
me. In the attorney Bobby Garon (also a personal friend whose sons played sports with mine), the 
Entergy CEO (and former University of Notre Dame football player) Rod West, and Roy Glapion 
Jr., a successful businessman whose father had also been a champion for high-quality recreation 
in New Orleans, I had beside me an array of well-known, well-respected, and well-spoken 
professionals who were passionate about creating equitable opportunities for New Orleans youth. 
They generously agreed to volunteer their time to lead a citizens advisory panel (CAP) so that 
reform of the city’s recreation programs could be a grassroots-driven rather than top-down project. 
The CAP was tasked with figuring out important questions related to governance and 
financing, and after many public meetings it submitted its recommendations to the city council in 
August 2009. The panel called for the creation of a commission to lead the city’s recreation 
programs, with monetary support coming jointly from the city budget and a fundraising foundation 
that would have its own board of directors. Under the CAP’s plan, some commission members 
were to be appointed by the mayor, some by the city council, and some from other organizations—
in contrast to the model used since 1946 that placed all control with the mayor. All meetings of 
the independent commission and its committees and all those of the fundraising foundation were 
to be open to the public, in line with the bottom-up approach that resulted in the reform proposal 
in the first place. In addition, the panel suggested that the duties of the parks department be merged 
with those of the recreation department so that the commission would also be in charge of the 
city’s recreation facilities. 
With the report filed, one would assume that the CAP’s work was done—but I am proud to 
say that Bobby, Rod, Roy, and I went on to hold public meetings every month and separately meet 
with numerous neighborhood associations and residents to solicit further input, and we even 
created a website for that purpose.6 Not content just to lobby my fellow councilmembers and other 
public officials to support the proposal, I relished discussing the reform plan with the coaches, 
parents, and others most closely affected by NORD’s decline. I was heartened by the community’s 
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enthusiasm for our efforts to make the city’s recreation system work and make it work for 
everyone. It was truly a grassroots movement in which all New Orleanians should take pride. 
On citizen input, I would be remiss if I did not mention that there was certainly a vocal 
minority in support of the status quo. Those citizens unquestionably had every right to participate 
in the process, and I valued their opinions. They tended to focus on the privatization of a function 
that had always been a municipal responsibility and questioned whether racial and geographic 
disparities in the provision of recreation services would persist or even grow. Current NORD 
employees were also worried about losing their jobs. In my answer I would often reference my 
own sons’ excellent experiences at Carrollton Boosters and ask detractors whether they thought 
the current NORD system was comparable. Dedicated private funding sources and continuity in 
leadership, I argued, could do more to reduce the inequities in different neighborhoods’ facilities 
and equipment than anything the city could do on its own. Furthermore, I said, there would be 
more recreation jobs and other opportunities in New Orleans under the proposed initiative. 
  With keen awareness of these policy arguments for and against, my council office took the 
lead in the translating the CAP’s report into proposed law—the city charter amendments and 
ordinances that would bring about the recommended reforms. On June 1, 2010 (in no small part 
because of my concerted lobbying, I like to think), the city council unanimously approved a 
package of measures that created the new, semi-autonomous New Orleans Recreation 
Development Commission (NORDC) and accompanying NORD Foundation, and newly sworn-in 
mayor Mitch Landrieu signed off shortly thereafter.7 Moreover, because of Mayor Landrieu’s 
commitment to increase the city’s budget allocation for recreation, it was determined that a 
property tax increase was not necessary, at least for the time being. Then, in early September, the 
council unanimously agreed on the impending commission’s makeup and composition—it would 
consist of thirteen members, including the mayor and two other high-level administration officials, 
one councilmember, leaders from the Recovery School District and the Orleans Parish School 
Board, the chairman of the City Planning Commission, one private citizen from each of the five 
council districts with expertise in or experience with recreation, and a representative of the NORD 
Foundation.8 It was a promising start but not nearly the end, since all changes to the city charter 
also require voter approval. NORDC was scheduled to be placed on New Orleanians’ ballots in 
October 2010. 
Meanwhile, I was thrilled to have overwhelmingly won re-election in February 2010, 
especially because it meant that I would be able to continue the push for recreation reform from 
my bully pulpit. Despite the “mandate” that some thought I had earned because of my relatively 
painless re-election, though, I felt that the NORDC vote was also a referendum on my first term. 
As such, I spent much of that summer and fall on the stump for the NORDC campaign—talking 
to voters and pitching the reform proposal, hearing their feedback, and requesting endorsements 
such as the ones garnered from the weekly business newspaper New Orleans CityBusiness and the 
good government organizations Citizens for 1 Greater New Orleans and the Bureau of 
Governmental Research. In many respects, the campaign for recreation reform was among the 
most meaningful labors of love of my entire council tenure, and going to the playgrounds to urge 
coaches and parents to give recreation reform a chance provided me with some of the best moments 
of my public life.  
In the end, I could not have dreamed of a better result. On October 4, 2010, the city charter 
amendment passed with a whopping 74 percent of the vote. Furthermore, in the 2011 city budget, 
Mayor Landrieu followed through on his funding promise to double the city’s allocation to 
recreation to approximately $10 million.9 Although the mayor did not go as close to total overhaul 
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as I and some of the other reformers would have liked, they were certainly delighted when the 
NORDC champion Roy Glapion Jr. was tapped to be the first chair of the new commission. 
Furthermore, the first CEO, Vic Richard—though a product of the old NORD system—embraced 
the public-private model. Vic thrived over the course of a successful tenure that lasted until 2018, 
exactly the type of leadership stability that we envisioned. 
In addition to Bobby, Rod, and Roy, there are countless individuals inside and outside 
government that have earned my eternal gratitude for their essential leadership in the NORD 
reform process. Among them are my city council staff members, whose hard work, intellect, and 
dedication made me a better advocate for this new recreation system for New Orleans. I firmly 
believe that they represent the best of city government, and without them NORDC would never 
have come to fruition. I would also like to take this opportunity specifically to thank the people of 
the great city of New Orleans for entrusting me with the enormous challenge of reversing the 
downward decline of our city’s recreation system for years to come.  
Today, more than nine years after the public vote, the NORDC system is certainly not perfect 
and has a way to go to achieve the heightened quality and equality we set out to provide to all New 
Orleanians. I am comforted, though, every time I drive by one of the many facilities that has been 
built or renovated in diverse neighborhoods all over town with the help of FEMA, the City of New 
Orleans, and the NORD Foundation and its steady source of financial assistance—facilities such 
as Wesley Barrow Stadium in Pontchartrain Park, which was rebuilt to host the Major League 
Baseball Urban Youth Academy (New Orleans is the only city without an major league baseball 
team to have such an academy).10 I am also comforted every time I hear that the city’s recreation 
system has earned a new award for excellence—such as the national accreditation it received in 
2017 for the first time since such a recognition became available nearly twenty-five years earlier.11  
I was deeply involved in many issue areas during my six-year stint in public service, but the 
most near and dear to my heart, and the most rewarding, was recreation reform. My goal was, and 
still is, equity for all throughout the recreation system, and I am optimistic that the city is headed 
in that direction. I believe that the recreation overhaul will have reached its full potential when all 
New Orleans youth and seniors, irrespective of neighborhood or race, will have the first-class 
recreation experience my own children enjoyed. I am looking forward to the day when a game 
between a Carrollton Boosters team and a NORDC team can be played at either team’s facility 
without anyone noticing any difference.  
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